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COMPARISON—IN PSYCHOLOGY AND IN LOGIC.
By B. BOSANQUBT.
It seems a pity to drop so interesting a discussion as that
initiated by Mr. Sully on Comparison in MIND 40, and continued
by Mr. Bradley in No. 41. I here approach the subject from
a different point of view but, I hope, a not uninstructive one.
Comparison in the psychological sense presupposes distinct
data, and an interest in comparing them. The data need not
be determinate individual objects, but must be so far distinct
perceptions as to be nameable or at least recognisable. Thus
comparison, in this sense, does not begin with the beginnings of
knowledge. The separate data presuppose perceptive judgments,
and the interest in comparing them presupposes an import—in the
widest sense, a use—attaching to some characteristic of the one,
and so suggested by reproduction or " redintegration " when we
Eerceive the other. Then the interest arises in asking "How andow far are the two data the same, or how and how far different?"
And such comparison ends when the judgment loses its special
cross-reference to the data with which it starts, and transforms
itself into an estimate of each datum by a standard that goes
beyond both. " He is an inch taller than me " is a comparative
judgment; as also would be " He is of the same height as I am,"
or " He is of a different height from me ". Bat the judgment of
identification, " We are both six feet high," or the judgments
involving difference, " He is six feet high and I am five feet
eleven inches," are not comparison in the above strictly limited
sense,—which I have called the psychological sense of comparison,
because it does not seem to me really to form a logical species.
Its differentia, if it were such a species, would be that it is
guided by the unanalysed idea of identity and diversity. The
analysis which this idea sets up transforms it into a general
standard, and then the special correlation of the data is done
away with. This is tested by the possibility of separating the
judgment of identification into single judgments. It is nonsense
to say (except elliptically) " I am of the same height," but it is
good sense to say " I am six feet high". The second judgment
refers to an explicit standard which replaces the accidental re-
lation to a particular datum. The difference between the two
judgments represents the point where comparison in the psy-
chological sense passes into a disjunction of cases under a
principle. The logical process is continuous, and is essentially
comparison after this point as before. That we do not call it so
is analogous to our counting only those terms as relative which go
 at U
niversity of M
ichigan on Septem
ber 12, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
406 B. BOSANQTJET :
together in pairs or threes, as " father and son," &c. We get off the
track of a process or relation when it becomes general in its scope.
It is especially within the limits above assigned to comparison
in the psychological sense, that the idea of reciprocal subsumption
or apperception of each datum under or by the other seems to
apply. I wish to raise the question how far this subsumption,
and especially its reciprocal character, is anything but a
characteristic of sense-perception and of imperfect knowledge.
The logical purpose of the whole process, which mast ultimately
govern the comparing activity even as known to psychology, is
surely to make the identity and diversity of the data explicit by
subsuming them not under each other, but under some standard,
quantitative perhaps, or else furnished by the notion of Kind or
of Purpose. The subsumption of one under the other, or rather
under an element in the other, is really the beginning of the
subsumption of both under a principle. But, of course, in the
effort to light on the principle we try elements first out of one
datum and then out of the other, and we look or listen alternately,
—chiefly because our sense is subject to time and space.
I will work out one or two examples. I have to match a
particular fish-hook. I take my pattern, hold the one I am
testing close beside it, and try if they coincide in length and
curve; supposing that they do. then I judge the second the same
as the first in these respects : I might say I subsume the length
and curve of the second under those of the first—better, I equate
the two. Then I recur to the first and examine the thickness of
the steel, and again subsume the corresponding property of the
second under this property. With reference to reciprocal sub-
sumption, a remark must be made here. We are apt, in
comparison, after one such subsumption as described above, to
continue dwelling on the second object, to pass on to another
property in it, and to make this a starting-point from which we
return to the first to subsume the corresponding property of this
first under this character in the second—nke a ship which unloads
one cargo and then takes another on board at the same port, so
as not to make an empty return journey. This kind of alter-
nation is, I think, a bad practice, and the source of confusion. It
is better not to pass on to a further quality in the second datum,
but to make an empty return journey and start again from a
further quality in the first object; otherwise we risk confusing
the first with the second object. But of course, at the end of the
process, the second may still have superfluous qualities, and we
must then take these as a datum and, finding nothing in the first to
correspond with them, register them as a difference between the
two. Apart from the erroneous tendency mentioned above, this is
the only trace that I can find of alternate subsumption. But in as
far as mastering the identity and diversity of the contents before
us is a process m time, of course there is successive subsumption.
I will now take a couple of instances in which comparison in
the psychological sense passes with unusual facility into logical
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comparison, •which is in fact simply inductive analysis. Here the
suggestion of Identity and Diversity operates, but favourable con-
ditions enable it to be transmuted almost at once into the
suggestion of a pervading principle ; and the subsumption be-
comes subsumption under a property or principle, ratner than
under an unanalysed content. This is because the emphasis and
repetition of certain attributes break through the shell of the
particular examples at once and without effort: comparison in
the psychological sense becomes a vanishing moment, and the
pervading identity in all the data forces itself on our consciousness;
i.e., all the data are subsumed under one identity. There is a
cage in the Zoological Gardens containing several kinds (six, I
think) of hawk or falcon. I happened to see them fed, and was
struck by the attitude which each of the six birds assumed, not
attempting to begin its food at once, but putting one foot on it
and looking round as if suspicious of an attack. So far as a first
rough identification goes, the single judgment of perception
not only started the comparison but completed it. But of course
such an identification is a mere suggestion compared with real
inductive analysis. For, to such analysis, it would not matter
about the attitude being the same in the birds which I happened
to observe—the data of my comparison in the psychological
sense—but only what the attitude was, what it meant, and of
what birds it was really characteristic. As regards the process
of the comparison itself—comparison in the psychological sense
—the account of it as alternate subsumption, or, as I have
preferred to say, successive subsumption, is not excluded by the
mere singleness of the perceptive judgment. We must admit
that a judgment may be single, and yet contain parts which are
also judgments. I make no doubt that within the continuous
whole of the comprehensive perception, "all these birds, Sic."
there was a series of perceptive judgments in which the attitude
of each bird was subsumed under that of some other, the latter
being itself qualified and reinforced by reproduction of the attitude
of those previously noticed. Only, in an example where the com-
mon attribute is so directly perceptible as it is m this, we find the
logical content of identical perception dwarfing the particular in-
stances and emerging as a characteristic or attribute within which
the several instances find their distinct places.
Another case which I remember distinctly was the occasion of
my first realising the typical appearance of implements of the
stone age. I had previously seen only isolated and inferior
specimens, and had felt perhaps a little sceptical as to their
being the work of man's hands at all. But happening to enter
the Blackmore Museum at Salisbury, where there were hundreds
of excellent specimens arranged in gradation according to the
fineness of their workmanship, I was of course at once enabled to
recognise the' identity of type pervading them. And I have no
doubt that in such a graduated arrangement the appearance pf
the finer products of more marked shape and adaptation to their
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4 0 8 B. BOSANQTTET : COMPARISON, ETC.
purpose reinforces and interprets the ruder shapes; or, using the
same phraseology as before, we may say that the ruder shapes
are subsumed under those whose import is more unmistakeable.
That is to say, we notice the latter first, and then, when we look
at the former, the latter are supplied by " redintegration," and so
enable us to pick out the characteristic outline in the ruder form.
That this process is a copious source of fallacy as well as of dis-
covery (for a rude outline is often of ambiguous interpretation)
only shows that it must be carried into detail with great care.
It is obviously the unconscious rudiment of the Method of
Concomitant Variations, which is only an application of the
principle that Identity cannot exhibit itself except in Difference.
The problems of degrees of Difference and of Identity seem to
me therefore to belong to logic and not to psychology. We are,
as I believe, on the wrong track, if we try to refer these degrees
to difficulty or delay experienced in the psychical process of
making identifications or transitions. We can only speak of
degree in reference to a standard, and this standard must be, I
think, of the nature either of Quantity or of Kind. Under the
head of Kind we may rank Purpose. If there is indiscernible
identity on the one hand, or mere qualitative distinction on the
other, then we have no question of degree. Two shades of green
are more or less of the same; but green and carmine would be,
I presume (if pure, which no actual colour-sensation ever is),
simply distinct, simply, that is, not the same, and no degree of
difference can be assigned them as colour. Of course as light-
stimuli they have a measurable relation.
It would follow that to ask as regards any two given terms
whether there is more identity or difference between them, is a
question entirely relative to the standard which we select. No
identity, and no difference, has an absolute value. The nearest
approach to such an absolute value is relation to a quantitative
scale. If the two terms can be referred to places on a scale,
which is exhaustive and of which the intervals are truly equal,
then we ywo facto judge whether the units which the two terms
have in common (their identity) or those by which the one
exceeds the other (their difference) make the greater sum. But
this is all. In using such a scale we use it for a purpose or for an
effect (e.y., in music and painting), and then the purpose or effect
at once becomes the standard of identity and difference. We may
say if we like that an aggregate of 100 sacks of corn compared
with 49 sacks has more difference than identity. But if we only
want 40, and are not bound or allowed to dispose of what we do
not want, the two aggregates are identical for our purpose. Mill,
in distinguishing analogy from induction (Logic, ii. 85), comes very
near attempting to balance likenesses as such against differences
as such in a way which is purely chimerical. We can make nothing
out of asking how much likeness or difference there is between
two terms. The only fruitful question is tcJuxt the likenesses, &c.,
are, and what they prove.
 at U
niversity of M
ichigan on Septem
ber 12, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
